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Abstract
How does income inequality and its structure affect credit? We extend the
theoretical framework by Kumhof et al. (2015) to distinguish between upper, middle
and low-income classes, and show that most of the positive impact of inequality on
credit predicted by Kumhof et al. (2015) should be driven by the share of total
output owned by the middle classes. Consistently, this impact should weaken in
countries where financial markets are insufficiently developed. These theoretical
predictions are empirically confirmed by a study based on a 41-country dataset
over the period 1970-2014, where exogenous variations of inequality are identified
with a new instrument variable, the total number of ILO conventions signed at the
country-level.
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1 Introduction
It has only been recently that academic attention started focusing on the potential
issues raised by the regular rise in both income and wealth inequalities. In this context,
Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (see Piketty, 2003, Piketty, 2014 or Atkinson et al., 2011) have
made seminal contributions emphasizing the rise in the top income, and the concentra-
tion of wealth over the past 30 years, in developed but also in some emerging economies.
Stiglitz (2012) warned of the huge cost of rising inequality in the US. At the beginning of
the 2010s, some academic economists started supporting a direct, causal relationship be-
tween those rising inequalities, the excess leverage of low- and middle-income households,
and the financial crisis. Debate entered the public sphere based on the arguments of Rajan
(2010) and Galbraith (2012) that rising income inequality forced low- and middle-income
households to increase their indebtedness in order to maintain their consumption levels.
Since then, this relationship has been the subject of a burgeoning academic literature,
focusing on different potential theoretical channels through which a rise in income inequal-
ities1 may endogenously trigger an expansion of credit.2 An important issue relates to the
type of income shock at stake, whether transitory (Krueger and Perri, 2006, Krueger and
Perri, 2011 or Iacoviello, 2008) or permanent (Piketty and Saez, 2013). Evidence from
various countries tends to show that the rise of inequalities is more likely to be explained
by permanent shocks.3 Consistently with these stylized facts pointing to permanent in-
come shocks associated with a long-term increase in between-group inequality, Kumhof
et al. (2015) provide a formal discussion within a DSGE model relying on inequalities
1Consistently with the literature and the mechanisms at stake, in the remainder of the paper, inequality
will refer to income inequality.
2Detailed surveys can be found in van Treeck (2014) and Bazillier and Hericourt (2017).
3On the US case, Kopczuk et al. (2010) show that income mobility decreased slightly since the 1950s.
A decreasing social mobility is inconsistent with inequalities explained by transitory income shocks.
Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002) and Moffitt and Gottschalk (2011) also find that the variance in transitory
income declined or remained constant after 1980 unlike the variance in permanent income. Cappellari
and Jenkins (2014) and Jenkins (2015a) report very similar evidence (lack of changes in social mobility
over time, decrease in income volatility observed) for the UK. On a cross-country perspective, Andrews
and Leigh (2009) confirm this negative link between income inequality and social mobility over a larger
sample of 16 countries. Similar evidence of an increase in between-group inequality, reflecting permanent
income shocks, has also been found in emerging countries (see Ferreira and Litchfield, 2008 on Brazil;
Kanbur and Zhuang, 2014 on some Asian countries including China, and India).
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between household groups, and where a more unequal income distribution leads to higher
leverage of low- and middle-income households; calibrated on US data, the framework
replicates fairly well the profiles of the income distribution and the debt-to-income ratio
for the three decades preceding the Great Recession.
On the empirical side, literature has also been scarce, and to some extent inconclusive.
Based on quarterly US data from 1980 to 2003, Christen and Morgan (2005) find evidence
consistent with a positive impact of inequality on household indebtedness, triggered by
an increase in credit demand from individuals. Based on data of individual mortgage
applications, still from the US, Coibion et al. (2016) find that low-income households in
high-inequality regions borrowed relatively less than similar households in low-inequality
regions. However, they do find a significant impact of the level of income on debt accumu-
lation in both regions. On a cross-country perspective, Bordo and Meissner (2012) rely on
a panel of 14 mainly advanced countries for 1920 to 2008 to study the determinants of total
bank credit growth using macroeconomic variables and the level of inequality measured by
the 1% top income share. They find no significant relation between inequality and credit
growth. However, based on a sample of 18 OECD countries over the period 1970-2007,
Perugini et al. (2016) find very different results, concluding to a positive impact of income
inequality on credit.
These contradictory outcomes emphasize the difficulties inherent in the identification
of a causal relationship between inequality and finance, due to the multiplicity of circular
linkages and intertwined credit supply and demand mechanisms. Besides, the existing
literature tends to focus almost only on the role of top incomes, which are opposed to
a “bottom category” which actually mixes low and middle incomes. This paper aims at
filling these different gaps. First, we include the potential role of middle-classes both
at the empirical and theoretical levels. Second, we propose a new identification strategy
based on International Labour Organization (ILO) ratifications’ behavior to allow a causal
interpretation of our results.
Theoretically, we provide an extension of the framework of Kumhof et al. (2015), first
by distinguishing explicitly between low and middle-class incomes, versus top incomes,
3
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and secondly, by identifying demand (in addition to supply) effects in the causal dynamics
between inequality and credit. On the one hand, supply-side arguments emphasize the
role of top incomes through the rise in global savings, which in turn triggered global
excess demand for securities driving up the credit supply. On the other hand, demand-
side arguments put an emphasis on the proactive will of low/middle-income households
to maintain their consumption level relative to that of top income households (‘keeping
up with the Joneses’ hypothesis).
The middle-class households are significantly richer than low-income ones. Even with-
out any assumption on the intensity of the demand-side mechanism, it generates striking
differences in terms of consumption per capita and of credit patterns. Consistently, our
model delivers three testable predictions: (i) an increase in inequality leads to an expan-
sion in household credit at the aggregate level, (ii) the bulk of the positive impact of
inequality on household credit is driven by the middle classes and (iii) this positive causal
link exists if and only if the country is sufficiently developed.
The model is then brought to the data to empirically investigate the existence and
the determinants of a causal relationship between inequality and the expansion of credit.
Endogeneity is a major issue in the proper identification of such a relationship, as both
variables are likely to be simultaneously determined by common shocks, and also due to
the obvious reverse causality from finance to inequality. We propose a strategy based on
variations in ratifications of ILO conventions at the country-level to predict exogenous
changes of inequality, and estimate their effect on credit dynamics. Our approach relies
on the exogeneity of the waves of ratifications at the international level in the 1970s
and the 1990s, while controlling for the other standard macro determinants of credit.
The strategy of ILO has changed over time. The organization expanded its technical
cooperation at the end of the 1970s, and has adopted a strategy of active promotion of core
labor standards and decent work in the 1990s (see the conclusions of the Social Summit of
Copenhagen in 1995 and the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
in 1998). Both evolutions have led to a substantial increase in countries’ ratification
which is arguably orthogonal to country-specific developments. As the implementation of
4
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international labor standards has been shown to be inequality-reducing, this exogenous
increase in ILO convention ratification allows us to identify the causal effect of inequalities
on credit.
Our empirical analysis relies on a country-level yearly dataset for 41 countries over
the period 1970-2014, based on two building blocks. Income inequality data come from
the World Income Inequality Database (WIID). Credit data (household, aggregate, firm)
come from various sources, such as the Bank of International Settlements, central banks,
the OECD and Datastream.4
We find that an exogenous increase in inequality coming from ILO ratification shocks
triggers an expansion of household credit. While Bordo and Meissner (2012) and Perugini
et al. (2016) were focusing on total credit, we show that this dynamic is driven by house-
hold credit, which is consistent with theoretical intuitions. In addition, we show that the
size of this effect varies substantially with the structure of income inequality. Starting
with the Gini index (scaled between 0 and 1), which can be understood as a synthetic
measure of inequality over the whole distribution, a one standard deviation increase is as-
sociated with a significant 7.3 percentage points increase in the household credit to GDP
ratio. Effects differ quite substantially when we focus on specific parts of the income
distribution. When inequality is measured through the top incomes share, an increase by
one standard deviation lifts credit to GDP ratio by 8.5 to 10.3%. Besides, and maybe
more importantly, we show that this effect is substantially higher when middle incomes
are involved: when their share in total income increases by one standard deviation (mean-
ing a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of income), credit to GDP decreases
by 11.5 to 19.4% percentage points, whereas the same increase in low-income share cuts
credit to GDP ratio by 6 percentage points.
A substantial part of the paper is devoted to exploring the sensitivity of our results
to robustness and falsification tests. The quantitative prevalence of the middle classes in
the positive link between inequality and credit is robust to various definitions of middle
4In both cases, data have been cleaned and harmonized through a transparent process which is detailed
in the Data section and Appendix B. Besides, various robustness checks are implemented in order to ensure
the stability of our estimates.
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incomes. Besides, an important falsification test is to check that income inequality does
not have any impact on credit granted to firms, which is indeed confirmed by the data.
The positive impact of inequality is found again on ratios of total credit over GDP, which
is consistent with Perugini et al.’s (2016) results; however, our own findings tend to
show that this results on credit is driven by credit to household. Furthermore, when
we split our sample between developed and developing/emerging countries, we find that
our results hold only for advanced countries, with most inequality indicators displaying
an insignificant impact on credit dynamics when the sample is restricted to developing
countries. Once again, this is consistent with our finding that most of the impact of income
inequality on credit is driven by middle-class incomes. According to Kochhar (2015) who
defines the middle and middle-upper classes as the group of individuals living on 10-50$
a day, they account for 15% of the population in Asia or 8% in Africa, against 60% in
Europe or 39% in North America. One complementary explanation relies on financial
market imperfections in developing countries. Those on poor and middle incomes cannot
respond to lower incomes by borrowing (Kumhof et al., 2012). We find indeed that
emerging countries displaying a sufficient level of openness to international capital flows
do exhibit a positive impact of inequality on household credit.5 Conversely, the Gini index
has no impact on credit for countries with a low or limited level of openness. This goes
again in the direction of a relaxation of credit constraints by incoming financial flows,
allowing wider categories of population to access credit, and consequently, to react to
variations in inequality. Finally, our results are mostly not impacted by the dynamics
arising with the financial crisis and the Great Recession of 2007-2008.
Our work has important implications regarding financial crisis prevention. Indeed,
there is a bunch of recent academic papers supporting that household leverage (i.e. hous-
ing credit and short-term finance) is the main driving factor of banking and financial
crises (see Buyukkarabacak and Valev, 2010; Jordá et al., 2013; Jordá et al., 2015b; Jordá
et al., 2015a; Mian and Sufi, 2010; Mian and Sufi, 2014).6 In order to avoid financial
5Which is consistent with the idea that inequality has an impact on the current account as shown by
Behringer and van Treeck (2018).
6Using the database by Schularick and Taylor (2012) on 14 developed countries from 1870 to 2008,
6
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crises such as the one of 2007-2008, which triggered afterwards the Great Recession, one
has therefore to prevent the creation of household leverage bubbles. Our findings suggest
that the reduction of inequality is an important prerequisite of such a policy, especially
at the middle of the income distribution. Hence, an implication of our results is that the
middle classes drive most of the financial cycle.
The next section presents the model and the main theoretical predictions. Section 3
presents the data and some descriptive statistics. Section 4 details our empirical method-
ology and our identification strategy. Section 5 reports our baseline results and a number
of robustness checks and falsification tests. The last section concludes.
2 The model
Our approach extends the model by Kumhof et al. (2015). In the latter, the economy
consists of two kind of agents, top and bottom earners, corresponding roughly to the top
5% and bottom 95% in the US case. Therefore, bottom earners in Kumhof et al. (2015)
involve de facto low and medium-income households. Our model consists of three groups
of households, referred to respectively as top earners, with population share χT , middle-
class earners with χM and low-income earners with χL. Here, an increase of inequalities
could be driven by a rise in top earners’ income zT , and/or a decrease in middle-class
share zM , and/or a decrease in low incomes zL. As stressed by Atkinson and Morelli
(2010), there is a potential heterogeneous role of income distribution changes. The model
respects the following conditions:
χT + χM + χL = 1 (1)
zTt + zMt + zLt = 1 (2)
Kirschenmann et al. (2016) show that income inequality tends to be a better predictor of financial crises
than bank loan growth. However, this does not mean inequality directly triggers financial crises, but
merely that bank loans are not the best way to measure excessive leverage induced by income inequality.
We will provide evidence throughout this paper that household credit is a more consistent and stronger
candidate.
7
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2.1 Middle-class earners
The representative middle class earner maximizes the intertemporal utility function:
V Mt = Et
∞∑
k≥0
βkM
(c
M
t+k)1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
+ γ
(
zMt+k
χM
bMt+k
)1− 1
θ
1− 1
θ
 (3)
where βkM is the time-discount factor for middle-class earners and σ is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. The first part of consumption preferences is the standard case
of CRRA consumption preference. The second part represents the credit demand-side
mechanism in the spirit of Christen and Morgan (2005).7 We ensure that, all things
being equal, their share of output is positively linked to the utility function. A similar
relationship holds for debt. The ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ hypothesis works through
the utility generated by the debt when one suffers an increase of inequalities. In other
words, the agent maintains his consumption despite the negative income shock relative to
other groups proxied by a decrease of zM . γ is the weight of this effect and we assume that
γ > 0. θ parameterizes the curvature of utility function with respect to this demand-side
effect.
This intertemporal utility function is subject to the following budget constraint:
cMt = yt
zMt
χM
+ bMt pMt − bMt−1 (4)
The first part is the per capita income of middle-class households while the second
part refers to debt flows: household receives bMt and reimburses bMt−1 from previous debt
contracted in period t − 1. These debt flows are specific to Kumhof et al. (2015): when
top earners lend to middle earners, they offer pMt units of consumption today in exchange
for 1 unit of consumption tomorrow if middle earners do not default.8 Similarly, when
7Ahlquist and Ansell (2017) use a complementary approach, which is called positional good arguments.
Bottom earners compare their consumption to the consumption of the rich, but only at the first period
in their model.
8A key feature of Kumhof et al. (2015) is endogenous default decision. We omit this default because
we look for comparative statistics and, as noted by Kumhof et al. (2015), “default has negligible effect
on the Euler equations in the neighborhood of the original steady state”. It is beyond the scope of this
8
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top earners lend to low-income earners, they offer pLt units of consumption, following the
same mechanism. The smaller the amount pt, the higher the implicit interest rate.
Middle-class earners maximize (3) subject to (4). Their optimal condition is as follows:
pMt = βMEt
(cMt+1
cMt
)− 1
σ
− γ ( zMt
χM
) θ−1
θ (
bMt
)− 1
θ (cMt )
1
σ (5)
This condition highlights a trade-off between the costs and benefits of a marginal
increase of debt. Benefits are linked to intertemporal consumption choices while costs
are explained by our specific demand-side argument. The latter holds only if θ < 1.
When zMt increases, indicating that inequalities around middle-incomes go down (that
is, when the share of total income earned by middle-class households increases), pMt goes
up. It means a reduction of middle-class earners’ demand with a lower implicit interest
rate. Symmetrically, an increase in inequalities implies a higher implicit interest rate
and, consequently, higher demand for loans from middle-class earners. By comparison,
Kumhof et al. (2015) provide a flat bottom earners’ demand price as a function of debt,
pb.
2.2 Low-Income Households
Low-income households display the same behavior as the middle-class ones, but with
one key difference: their share of output is significantly lower than the middle-class one,
that is zM > zL. Their utility has the same functional form and the same elasticities σ
and θ.9
Calculations, similar to the previous one, give this optimal condition:
pLt = βLEt
(cLt+1
cLt
)− 1
σ
− γ ( zLt
χL
) θ−1
θ (
bLt
)− 1
θ (cLt )
1
σ (6)
paper, but we can expect a different penalty for defaults for low- and middle-income groups, which in
turn affect trade-off about rational default decisions.
9As discussed below, other restrictive assumptions are feasible such as various discount factors or the
strength of the demand-side mechanism. We do not use these assumptions to ensure the consistency of
our testable predictions.
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2.3 Top-Income Households
Top earners’ utility from consumption has the same functional form and has the same
parameter σ. By contrast with low- and middle-income earners, top earners provide loans
to these two previous groups. This financial wealth is directly incorporated into their
utility function, which implies a positive marginal propensity to save out of permanent
income shock, following e.g. Carroll (2000) and Kumhof et al. (2015). The wealth pref-
erence alters the arbitrage between consumption and debt in favor of supplying loans to
other types of households. By contrast with Kumhof et al. (2015), it is not additive with
respect to the two amounts of debt, which is broadly consistent with Carroll (2002) and
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008). They document the high-level of diversification in top
income earners’ portfolios and investigate various determinants such as age, education
and financial sophistication.
Consequently, ϕL and ϕM are the weights of wealth in utility when top earners lend
to low-income and middle-income earners, respectively. η parameterizes the curvature of
the utility function with respect to wealth.
V Tt = Et
∞∑
k≥0
βkT
(cTt+k)1− 1σ
1− 1
σ
+ ϕL
(1 + χL
χT
(bLt+k))
1− 1
η
1− 1
η
+ ϕM
(1 + χM
χT
(bMt+k))
1− 1
η
1− 1
η
 (7)
We can write top earners’ budget constraints as follows:
cTt = yt
zTt
χT
+ χ
L
χT
(bLt−1 − bLt pLt ) +
χM
χT
(bMt−1 − bMt pMt ) (8)
The first part represents the per capita income of top earners. The second and third
part are per capita debt flows towards the two other household groups. The first order
conditions for bMt and bLt are logically close to the ones from Kumhof et al. (2015).
pLt = βTEt
[
(c
T
t+1
cTt
)− 1σ
]
+ ϕL (c
T
t )
1
σ
(1 + χL
χT
bLt )
1
η
(9)
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pMt = βTEt
[
(c
T
t+1
cTt
)− 1σ
]
+ ϕM (c
T
t )
1
σ
(1 + χM
χT
bMt )
1
η
(10)
As suggested by Kumhof et al. (2015), these conditions reflect the trade-off between
benefits and costs of acquiring an additional unit of financial wealth. In addition, we
distinguish our supply-side argument: an increase in top earners’ income share zTt in cTt
leads to a decrease of implicit interest rate. They also suggest a no-arbitrage condition
between loans to low-income earners and those to middle-class earners.
2.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium the three groups maximize their respective lifetime utilities, the market
for borrowing and lending clears and the market clearing condition for goods holds:
yt = χT cTt + χMcMt + χLcLt (11)
Two properties appear in equilibrium. First, the Euler equations (5), (6), (9) and (10)
can be interpreted as the price of demand and supply of these loans while keeping their
consumption constant. The following condition holds:
bit−1 − btpt = bi(1− pi(bi)) (12)
So the optimal consumption of the three groups changes with y as output in steady-
state. There are given by:
cT = yzT 1
χT
+ χ
L
χT
(bL(1− pL(bL))) + χ
M
χT
(bM(1− pM(bM))) (13)
cM = yzM 1
χM
+ 1
χM
bM(pM(bM)− 1) (14)
cL = yzL 1
χL
+ 1
χL
bL(pL(bL)− 1) (15)
Second, we look for the neighborhood of the steady-state. Therefore, we simplify these
11
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demands and supplies to yield:
pM(bM) = βM − γ
(
zMt
χM
) θ−1
θ (
bMt
)− 1
θ (cMt )
1
σ (16)
pM(bM) = βT + ϕM
(cT ) 1σ
(1 + χM
χT
bM)
1
η
(17)
pL(bL) = βL − γ
(
zLt
χL
) θ−1
θ (
bLt
)− 1
θ (cLt )
1
σ (18)
pL(bL) = βT + ϕL
(cT ) 1σ
(1 + χL
χT
bL)
1
η
(19)
We aim to obtain steady-state relationships similar to Kumhof et al. (2015) but we
cannot simply drop the price because of supply-demand equality. By contrast, our exten-
sion gives two debt levels (bM , bL) with their prices (pM , pL). We combine equations (13)
to (19)10 and we differentiate these relationships to obtain a causal impact.
Demand-side effect. To highlight the demand-side argument, we can derive the effect
of an increase in low- and middle-classes’ income share zi on the steady-state debt level
bi for i ∈ (L,M) and i 6= j. As we show in Appendix A, it yields
dlog(bi)
dlog(zi)
=
Demand Side︷ ︸︸ ︷
θ − 1
θ
+
KRW (2015)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
σ
1
χi
y
ci
1
θ︸︷︷︸
Borrower pref.
+ 1
σ
1
χi
1− pi
ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
quantity vs price
+ 1
η
χi
χT
1
1 + χi
χT
bi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Top income pref.
− 1
σ
χi
χT
1− pi
cT︸ ︷︷ ︸
CRRA
(20)
This equation exhibits a negative effect if θ < 1 (our previous assumption), the second
term in the numerator is not too high and the denominator is globally positive. We dis-
entangle this latter into four terms. The first directly depends on the borrower preference
10Because these equations are interlinked, we do not present direct steady-state relationship as equation
(17) in Kumhof et al. (2015). But the balance of supply and demand of both kinds of credit suggests
positive loans as long as these conditions βM > βT and βL > βT are satisfied. In addition, we implicitly
assume that the endogenous amount of debt and consumption as well as interest rate do not change the
sign of our testable predictions.
12
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in equations (5) and (6). By contrast with Kumhof et al. (2015), the second part reflects
the trade-off between price and quantity for loans. A decrease in inequality through the
rising part of borrowers’ income share could negatively affect interest rates, more than
credit quantity. The two last parts are close to equation (18) of Kumhof et al. (2015)
and respectively represent the top income households’ preference on wealth and a specific
CRRA function effect. To sum up, the denominator is positive if the implicit interest rate
is not too high and/or the consumption of the top income household is high.
In addition, our model allows a definition of the cross-derivatives, which measure the
responsiveness of the loans demanded by a borrower’s group to a change in the income
share of the other borrower’s group. As described in Appendix A, the impact is positive
if the demand-side argument works.
Supply-side effect. To show the supply-side argument, we proceed the same way with
an increase in the top earners’ income share zT ,
dlog(bi)
dlog(zT )
=
1
σ
y
χT
1
cT
1
θ
+ 1
σ
1
χi
1−pi
ci
+ 1
η
χi
χT
1
1+ χi
χT
bi
− 1
σ
χi
χT
1−pi
cT
(21)
If the denominator is again positive, the supply-side argument holds.
Difference between middle-class and low-income households. We determine if the
bulk of the positive impact of inequality on household credit is driven by the middle-class
or by the low-income class. If the middle class is the key driver, so we should have
dlog(bM)
dlog(zM)
<
dlog(bL)
dlog(zL)
< 0 (22)
We show in Appendix A that equation 22 holds under three reasonable conditions:
(i) middle-class consumption should be significantly higher than that of the low-income
household, (ii) poor household should be more credit-constrained than the middle class,
(iii) the pass-through to the implicit interest rate of an inequality shock should not be
13
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too high.
2.5 Testable Predictions
We can derive three main theoretical predictions, which we will subsequently bring to
the data:
Testable Prediction 1: An increase in inequality leads to an expansion in household
credit at the aggregate level. This is consistent with both Kumhof et al. (2015) and our
own setting. Here, it is the combination of a demand-side effect (equation 20) and a
supply-side effect (equation 21).
Testable Prediction 2: The bulk of the positive impact of inequality on household
credit is driven by the middle class (equation 22).
Testable Prediction 3: The positive causal link from inequality to household credit
exists if and only if the country is sufficiently developed. As proposed by Kumhof et al.
(2012), the credit constraints are so high in the emerging world that potential borrowers
have little access to domestic financial markets and no access to international ones. In
these countries, top income households “deploy their surplus funds abroad, leading to
current account surpluses”, which drop current wealth preference, i.e. the parameters ϕL
and ϕM are equal to 0.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis relies on a country-level yearly dataset for 41 countries over
the period 1970-2014, based on two building blocks, income inequality and credit.
3.1 Inequality
The use of inequality data in cross-country studies raises several challenges. The
use of one specific index of inequality and one specific database is not neutral. Jenkins
(2015b), among others, shows how it can have major implications on empirical results.
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One contribution of this paper is to rely on several alternative indexes of inequalities
focusing on different parts of the income distribution. Furthermore, we implement a
transparent process to choose the relevant primary source in order to ensure comparability
among countries.
Bordo and Meissner (2012) and Perugini et al. (2016), among others, use top income
shares from the World Top Income Database (WTID). This database built by Alvaredo
et al. (2014) is available for 31 countries with high time coverage for some countries. It uses
fiscal data. One serious limitation is that it is based on pre-tax and not disposable income.
As we focus on the saving and borrowing behavior of households, it represents a serious
drawback as these data do not take into account the effect of fiscal redistribution on the
disposable income. Also, by definition, this database focuses exclusively on top incomes.
As stated by Atkinson and Morelli (2010) in the context of banking crises, “different parts
of the income distribution react differently, and the conclusions drawn regarding the origins
and the impact of the crisis may depend on which part of the parade we are watching. The
top and the bottom may be the most affected; depending on the theoretical model adopted,
either the top or the bottom may be more relevant to understand the origins of the crisis”
(p. 66). Here, our aim is to focus on the potential heterogenous role of different shocks
along the income distribution on the inequality-credit relationship. Any distributional
change within the bottom 90% will not be captured by top income share indexes.
By contrast with the literature, we consequently focus on different indexes of inequali-
ties, namely: the Gini coefficient, income shares per decile, as well as ratios between those
income shares. The use of the Gini index will give a more general picture as it takes into
account the whole distribution of income and not only tails dynamics. Afterwards, we go
one step deeper by investigating the impact of different income shares categories: the top
incomes, alternatively defined as the share of income owned by the Top 10% (correspond-
ing to incomes after the 9th decile) and Top 30% (corresponding to incomes after the 7th
decile); the middle class incomes, defined alternatively as Middle 30-70% (corresponding
to incomes after the 3rd and up to the 7th decile) and Middle 30-90% (corresponding to
incomes after the 3rd and up to the 9th decile); the bottom incomes, defined as the share
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of income owned by the Bottom 30% (corresponding to incomes up to the 3rd). Finally,
we complement this by using the ratios of these different shares, in order to assess the
impact of relative variations, i.e. gain or impoverishment of one category versus another
one. More precisely, we study the impact of the ratio of Top incomes over middle-class
incomes (Top 10/Middle 30-90, and Top 30/Middle 30-70), and Top incomes over Bottom
incomes (Top 10/Bottom 30, and Top 30/Bottom 30).11 More generally, the detailed
analysis with income share per decile allows us to disentangle the specific effect of income
shocks for the poorest and income shocks for the middle class. This will allow us to test
some implications of the theoretical model. More specifically, if lower incomes are highly
credit-constrained, i.e. if they have a more difficult access to credit, the income dynamics
of the middle class is more likely to have an effect on credit dynamics.
For the Gini index and statistics per decile, we follow Jenkins (2015b), recommending
the use of the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) instead of the Standardized
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). The former has updated and extended the
Deininger and Squire (1996) database and corrected some of the inconsistencies pointed
out by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001, 2009). It also includes new estimates from National
Survey statistics, TransMonEE (2011), the Commitment to Equity Project (CEQ) ,the
Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC, 2016), the
Luxembourg Income Study, OECD and EUROSTAT. It covers 161 countries between
1867 and 2015. By comparison, the SWIID from Solt (2009) has broader coverage than
the WIID, with a lower number of missing observations. We choose not to use this data,
mostly because of potential problems raised by the imputation procedure that is used to
fill missing data in the WIID.12
We provide a transparent process to use WIID rigorously. The use of several data
types (gross versus net income data, household versus individual income data and income
versus expenditure data) may alter the comparability of the inequality measures (Atkinson
11Note that these ratios are intuitively closed to the Palma (Palma, 2011) index that combines the top
10% income share with the bottom 40% income share.
12This debate falls within the trade-off between the geographical coverage and the reliability of the
data. See Jenkins (2015b) and Solt (2015).
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and Brandolini, 2001, Jenkins, 2015b), so it is necessary to use comparable data across
sources. Our rules of selection ensure high-quality data within and between countries. We
keep only observations with specific characteristics: they are coded as high (or medium)
quality, and they concern post-tax income. They are also consistent according to the
income share unit, the unit of analysis, the geographical, age and population coverages
and they employ similar equivalence scale. Our selection promotes the use of one unique
dataset but also provides arguments in favor of some datasets mix. To ensure consistency,
we generally prefer to use only one dataset.13 In some cases, we face a trade-off between
the use of one particular dataset with potential limited linear interpolations and the use
of multiple datasets, especially when these datasets come from the same institutions. We
combine datasets if and only if the risk of structural break is very low.14 Appendix B
summarizes the primary sources used for each country. A total of 19,5% (8 countries15
out of 41) of our sample use series mixing different primary sources.
3.2 Credit
By contrast with the existing works based on cross-country samples, we refer to house-
hold credit16, which is much more relevant to analyze the potential effect of inequalities.
There is no theoretical mechanism to explain the potential effect on other sources of pri-
vate credit such as business credit.17 Besides, we rely on the ratio of household credit over
GDP, since recent literature (e.g. Atkinson and Morelli, 2015) emphasizes that it is the
excessive level of credit compared to output that may lead to financial instability. Increas-
ing levels of credit do not imply instability if productive investment is funded, triggering
13In some limited cases, we fill missing data by using a linear interpolation. We use this technique only
if the time span between two observations is limited.
14These following conditions should be met: (1) same (or very close) definition of welfare; (2) same
share unit; (3) same unit of analysis; (4) same equivalence scale; (5) the Gini and deciles should follow
same trends before and after the risk of structural break, (6) the Gini should be similar in the year of
matching the two datasets.
15Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden. We also use different datasources for South
Korea and United Kingdom for various decades but without any interpolation across years.
16Bordo and Meissner (2012) use the log of bank credit to the private sector, and Perugini et al. (2016),
the ratio of total private credit to GDP.
17In addition, Buyukkarabacak and Valev (2010) find that business credit is a much weaker predictor
of financial crises.
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an increase in the long-run output: In other words, we are not that much interested in
the growth of credit per se, but in the share of the latter which creates potentially an in-
creased macroeconomic risk, i.e. which does not translate into a corresponding increase in
potential output. However, we also check in additional estimates how our results behave
when we use the log of household credit.
Our main datasource for household credit is the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS): Over 87% (36 countries) of household credit directly comes from BIS. The re-
mainder of household credit data comes from Central Banks and Oxford Economics from
Datastream, and has been carefully checked and harmonized (see Data Appendix B). Note
that aggregate private credit computed by the BIS involves loans from both the domestic
and international financial sector. In robustness checks, we check how inequality affects
total credit to the private sector, using the corresponding variable from the BIS database,
and also two alternative indexes from the World Bank (WB), which are restricted, re-
spectively, to private credit from the domestic financial sector, and from domestic banks.
We also use credit granted to private firms as a falsification test, since the theoretical
underlying intuitions do not imply it will affected by inequality.
3.3 Other variables
The classical determinants of credit pointed to the literature are financial liberaliza-
tion, monetary dynamics and the level of economic development. Regarding financial
liberalization, we use indexes of credit market deregulation provided by the Fraser In-
stitute18, concerning private ownership of banks, existence of interest rate controls and
negative interest rates, and the extent to which government borrowing crowds out private
borrowing.
Monetary dynamics are a key determinant of credit in various theoretical contexts. We
proxy the monetary environment by broad money supply, i.e. M2/GDP ratio from World
Bank, following the previous literature, notably Elekdag and Wu (2011) and Perugini
et al. (2016). The level of economic development also affects the depth of the domestic
18Data available at https://www.fraserinstitute.org/
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financial system on the one hand and the level of the financial exclusion frontier in the
flavor of French et al. (2013) on the other hand. We use the standard proxy, GDP per
capita, provided once again by the World Bank.
4 Empirical methodology
4.1 Baseline specification
Our main objective is to identify how inequality, and its structure, affect the household
credit at the country-level. In general, we want to estimate a specification of the following
form:
Crediti,t = βIneqi,t + ΓXi,t + µi + λt + εi,t (23)
where Crediti,t and Ineqi,t are respectively the household credit over GDP and in-
equality in country i during year t. Inequality impact will be assessed through various
measures (Gini and Palma indexes, deciles of income) in order to clarify the role of the
structure of income distribution. Xi,t is a vector of controls including M2/GDP, log(GDP
per capita) and the index of financial deregulation. µi denotes country-fixed effects, and λt
represents year dummies. The former captures all time-invariant country characteristics
and the latter common trends and shocks, in particular common business cycle condi-
tions. We are specifically interested in changes in credit driven by exogenous variations
in inequality. Our coefficient of interest is β: our model predicts β > 0 when inequality
rises, i.e. when the Gini index and the share of top incomes (top 10%, top 30%) in the
total income increases, or when the share of low and middle incomes decreases.
Table 1 below shows the results obtained when equation 23 is estimated by OLS.
Column (1) reports the estimated coefficient when inequality is proxied through the Gini
index. Columns (2) to (6) use alternatively different deciles of income, distinguishing
between the rich (Top 10 and Top 30 ), the middle classes (corresponding to either incomes
after the 3rd and up to the 9th decile, denominated Mid. 30-90%, or to incomes after the
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3rd and up to the 7th decile, Mid. 30-70%). Finally, columns (7) to (10) rely on the ratio
between top incomes and middle and lower incomes.
The correlation between inequality and credit is correctly signed according to theoret-
ical predictions (except for bottom incomes in column (6)), but insignificant. This echoes
the findings of Bordo and Meissner (2012), who find insignificant correlations when using
a similar specification - but with log of credit as a dependent variable.
Table 1: OLS specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable: Household Credit/GDP
Inequality Measure Gini Top 10 Top 30 Mid. 30-90 Mid. 30-70 Bottom Top10
Mid.30−90
Top10
Bottom
Top30
Mid.30−70
Top30
Bottom
Inequality 0.221 0.465 0.329 -0.935 -0.909 0.0734 0.223 0.0290 0.0692 0.0189∗
(0.351) (0.501) (0.463) (0.875) (0.896) (0.922) (0.223) (0.0177) (0.0678) (0.0109)
GDP per capita 0.0212 0.0242 0.0228 0.0304 0.0285 0.0216 0.0255 0.0254 0.0260 0.0238
(0.0613) (0.0639) (0.0621) (0.0688) (0.0666) (0.0606) (0.0644) (0.0616) (0.0636) (0.0605)
Broad Money Ratio 0.147∗ 0.144∗ 0.146∗ 0.146∗ 0.145∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.144∗ 0.145∗ 0.146∗ 0.144∗
(0.0748) (0.0747) (0.0747) (0.0742) (0.0745) (0.0736) (0.0746) (0.0742) (0.0745) (0.0741)
Credit Dereg. -0.00771 -0.00796 -0.00788 -0.00751 -0.00803 -0.00689 -0.00781 -0.00831 -0.00792 -0.00851
(0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.00988) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Cons. -0.191 -0.268 -0.308 0.348 0.113 -0.146 -0.261 -0.225 -0.282 -0.224
(0.595) (0.632) (0.623) (0.892) (0.763) (0.637) (0.642) (0.608) (0.637) (0.595)
Obs. 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
adj. R2 0.661 0.663 0.662 0.666 0.664 0.661 0.664 0.668 0.664 0.667
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Country and Year Fixed Effects.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
However, for a number of reasons these OLS estimates may be heavily biased. First,
credit and inequality are likely to be simultaneously determined by shocks, such as the
deregulation waves in the 1980s and the 1990s19, which increased simultaneously the two
variables; in that case, β is positively biased. We reduce the bias by controlling for
financial liberalization, but other dimensions and shocks might still be at play. Another
obvious issue relates to reverse causality: credit is very much likely to have an impact
on inequality, even if the direction and size of the impact are questioned to some extent
in the literature (see Bazillier and Hericourt, 2017), making the extent and sign of the
bias on β uncertain. Finally, Table 2 below shows that credit is much more volatile than
19As the deregulation wave occurs simultaneously in most developed countries, part of this effect is
captured through the time dummies. However, differences in the timing of financial deregulation may
still bias our OLS estimates.
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inequality (whichever measure is considered): this creates an attenuation bias driving β
towards zero, and may be due to the fact that country-level idiosyncratic shocks on these
variables are probably not the same.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Credit and Inequality
Mean First quartile Median Third quartile S.D.within S.D.overall
Levels
Gini 0.340 0.267 0.317 0.374 0.020 0.099
Top 10 0.268 0.218 0.244 0.282 0.016 0.076
Top 30 0.537 0.481 0.517 0.563 0.015 0.079
Middle 30-90 0.60 0.594 0.617 0.629 0.011 0.046
Middle 30-70 0.332 0.322 0.347 0.361 0.009 0.046
Bottom 0-30 0.131 0.111 0.135 0.158 0.007 0.034
Top 10/Middle 30-90 0.461 0.350 0.394 0.473 0.039 0.187
Top 30/Middle 30-70 1.706 1.337 1.487 1.740 0.125 0.635
Top 10/Bottom 0-30 2.515 1.375 1.801 2.527 0.407 1.971
Top 30/Bottom 0-30 4.800 3.025 3.851 5.017 0.582 2.872
Household credit/GDP 0.421 0.178 0.397 0.580 0.138 0.279
log(real household credit) 6.579 5.181 6.475 7.419 0.739 2.379
ILO Conv. 64.68 41 69 87 6.547 31.85
4.2 Identification strategy
To identify how variations in inequality driven by exogenous shocks affect household
credit over GDP, we need an instrument that affect inequality without influencing directly
credit (exclusion restriction), and that is orthogonal to any country-specific characteristics
which may drive simultaneously both variables (inequality and credit). This notably
excludes indicators of labor market flexibility and institutions. Indeed, labor market and
financial liberalization often belong to the same policy package, with two consequences:
an increase in the demand for credit due to the fall in workers’ bargaining power, and an
increase in credit supply explained by financial liberalization (see Tridico, 2012).
Therefore, we propose to exploit exogenous changes in policies of the International
Labor Organization. These changes were largely exogenous to specific country character-
istics but had a direct impact on the number of ILO conventions ratified by a country.
We will show that the ratifications of ILO conventions are likely to be correlated with
country-level inequality. In other words, we propose to rely on a “quasi-natural experi-
ment” environment provided by the strategy of the International Labor Organization. In
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normal times, one can argue that the ratification of ILO conventions is likely to depend on
countries’ characteristics, which will violate the exclusion restriction in our identification
strategy. However, we identify two waves of ratifications that are likely to be exogenous
to these national characteristics. As we can see in Figure 1, the first wave of increase
starts in the mid-1970s and the second one in the 1990s. We detail below the reasons why
these two waves are very likely to be exogenous to countries’ characteristics.
Figure 1: ILO’s Conventions Ratifications
Source: ILO website, compilation by the authors.
The International Labor Organisation and waves of ratifications. The Inter-
national Labor Organisation (ILO) was created in 1919, as part of the Treaty of Versailles
that ended World War I, “to reflect the belief that universal and lasting peace can be
accomplished only if it is based on social justice” (ILO Website).20 The ILO has 187
member states, is the oldest UN agency and is characterized by its tripartite structure:
each state is represented by its government, by workers’ representatives and by employers’
representatives. They set international labor standards by adopting conventions and rec-
ommendations. The ratification of conventions is voluntary. Once one country has ratified
20http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm
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a convention, it becomes binding. Ratifying countries commit themselves to applying the
convention in national law and practice and to reporting on its application at regular
intervals. Today, there are 189 conventions covering all fields related to labor relations
(collective bargaining, forced labor, child labor, equality of opportunity and treatment,
labor administration and inspection, employment policy, vocational guidance and train-
ing, job security, wages, working time, occupational safety and health, social security,
maternity protections...). Areas covered by these conventions are therefore much broader
than labor market institutions.
ILO strategy has evolved over time (see Rodgers et al., 2009 for a global overview of
ILO history). The launching of the World Employment Programme in 1969 “marked the
formal beginning of an ILO concern with problems of poverty reduction in developing coun-
tries” (Rodgers et al., 2009, p. 186). Then, under the leadership of the Director-General
Francis Blanchard (1973 - 1989), the ILO expanded significantly technical cooperation
programs (such as the PIACT, the French acronym for the International Programme for
the Improvement of Working Conditions and Environment, launched in 1975) in order
to assist countries in the implementation of international labor standards. Regional em-
ployment teams were established in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia
during the 1970s. This led to a substantial increase in ILO ratifications, particularly
in developing countries. Clearly, these ratifications became possible because of the ILO
policy and were not related to policy changes within countries.
The ILO model of tripartite dialogue was contested in the 1980s with the increasing
influence of free-market economics in international economic policies. But the fall of the
Eastern European socialist regimes and the disintegration of the Soviet Union created
new demands for the ILO, notably to strengthen independent workers’ and employers’
organizations in the countries concerned. A debate started in the middle of the 1990s
around the social costs of globalization and the Washington consensus. This created a
new political space for ILO actions. The 1995 Social Summit of Copenhagen and the 1998
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work gave a new focus on Human
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Rights at Work with the recognition of the core labor standards (freedom of association
and collective bargaining, elimination of forced labor and child labor, and eradication of
discrimination at work). This led to a new dynamic of ratifications, once again more
related to global trends than specific national contexts. Once more, technical cooperation
programs played a role, with the implementation of the International Program on the
Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), starting in 1992, targeting more than 90 countries.
Part of the impulsion came from additional funding from a growing number of donor
countries (Rodgers et al., 2009, p. 73).
A careful look at the evolution of the ILO ratifications over time is consistent with
the two different waves we identified analyzing the history of the ILO. On average over
the period, there are 30 additional conventions that are ratified per year. But we observe
some peaks. In 1971 (corresponding to the beginning of the first wave), we observed 62
additional conventions, and the number of ratifications between 1977 and 1981 (end of
the first wave) is above average (from 36 in 1977 to 51 in 1981). The second wave starts
in the mid-90s and we observe two peaks in 1999 and 2000 (with respectively 49 and
44 ratifications), right after the adoption of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work. This is consistent with our hypothesis that it is possible to identify
dynamics of ratifications that depend on the international policies and strategies of the
ILO, and not on national circumstances. We believe it is a strong argument supporting
the orthogonality condition of our instrument.
ILO ratifications and credit market liberalisation. One particular threat to iden-
tification is that ILO conventions might be correlated with other variables that should
also have an impact on inequalities. If governments aiming at strengthening labor regula-
tions are also ratifying ILO conventions, our instrument would be correlated with broader
labor market regulations. It would be a matter of concern if labor market deregulation
and financial deregulation are correlated, as the latter is likely to have a direct effect
on our dependent variable: household credit. It is the main argument of Tridico (2012)
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who shows that these two policies are often part of the same policy package of deregu-
lation. It is why we do not use indexes of labor market regulations as instrument. We
therefore check the dynamics of both the instrument (ILO ratification) and credit market
liberalisation.
We find that the evolution of ILO ratifications is poorly correlated with the evolution
of both labor market regulation and credit market regulation. The correlation between
ILO ratifications and the evolution of the credit market (respectively, labor market) dereg-
ulation is only 0.08 (respectively, 0.04). We also compute what is the average change in
the credit market deregulation index, when there is no change in the number of ILO rat-
ifications, when there is one additional ILO ratified conventions, and when there is more
than one ratified ILO convention. We do not observe significant differences between the
average evolution of the index of credit market deregulation, depending on the number
of additional ILO conventions ratified.21 We also test the opposite relation: the aver-
age change in ILO convention ratification when there is respectively more credit market
regulation, no change, or less credit market regulation. The average change in ILO con-
vention ratification is not statistically different depending on the change in credit market
regulation.
Beyond this analysis of correlation, we identified two main waves of ratifications: mid
70s to the beginning of the 1980s and the end of the 1990s. These waves are not related
to the massive liberalization packages that occurred mainly in the 1980s and early to
mid-1990s. This is an additional argument showing that these waves of ratifications are
uncorrelated with the dynamics of liberalization. We therefore conclude that the change
in inequalities explained by our instrument is not likely to be driven by other policy
changes.
For all these reasons, we argue that the main dynamics in ILO conventions ratifications
are explained by global policies and strategies, exogenous to countries’ characteristics, and
consequently should not violate the exclusion restriction in our IV strategy.
21Average change in credit market deregulation index is respectively 0.05, 0.06 and 0.09 when there is
no change, one addition ILO convention and more than one additional ILO convention. The confidence
intervals for each mean cross each other.
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ILO conventions and inequalities. On the other side, the ratification of ILO conven-
tions is likely to have an effect on inequalities, ensuring the strength of our instrument.
This assumption is confirmed by Calderón and Chong (2009) in a cross-country study
on the effect of labor regulations on inequality. They argue that “there appears to be
an impact on the distribution of income as a result of a country having accumulated an
increasing number of International Labor Organization conventions ratified by a country
over time” (Calderón and Chong, 2009, p.75). This negative link between labor market
institutions and inequalities has been confirmed by Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2008)
on a panel of OECD countries over the 1969-2004 period, even when taking into account
the potential adverse effect in terms of unemployment.
Therefore, we use as instrumental variable the number of ILO conventions ratified,
which is both time and country-varying. Our main econometric strategy estimates the
effect of exogenous changes in inequality (through variations in the number of ILO con-
ventions ratified) on the ratio of household credit to GDP:
Ineqi,t = αILOi,t + δXi,t + λi + λt + µi,t (24)
Crediti,t = βÎneqi,t + ΓXi,t + λi + λt + εi,t (25)
where Îneqi,t is the predicted value of the inequality index from Equation 24. Given
that they give higher protection and bargaining power to workers, we expect a negative
association between this variable and inequality. This is what confirms Table 3: Inequality
decreases when the number of ILO conventions ratified increases. Put differently a higher
number of signed ILO conventions decreases the Gini index and the share of Top incomes,
and increases the shares of bottom and middle incomes. This result also holds when
we include instead lagged values of the number of ILO conventions (see Table C.2 in
Appendix C). In Appendix C, we also provide evidence that ILOi,t is not likely to violate
exclusion restrictions seriously. Table C.3 reports estimates of a modified Equation 23,
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including the number of ILO conventions ratified (ILOi,t). Results largely support that
the exclusion restrictions are respected, whatever the indicator of inequality used or the
considered countries (developed or emerging): the number of ILO conventions appears
consistently insignificant in most cases, or weakly significant in a couple of specifications.
Table 3: First stage, Inequality structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Var. Gini Top 10 Top 30 Middle 30 90 Middle 30 70 Bottom Top10
Mid.30−90
Top10
Bottom
Top30
Mid.30−70
Top30
Bottom
# ILO Conv. -0.00108∗∗∗ -0.000613∗∗∗ -0.000697∗∗∗ 0.000224∗ 0.000308∗∗∗ 0.000445∗∗∗ -0.00135∗∗∗ -0.0187∗∗∗ -0.00499∗∗∗ -0.0296∗∗∗
(0.000220) (0.000181) (0.000176) (0.000132) (0.000108) (0.0000860) (0.000425) (0.00412) (0.00126) (0.00601)
GDP per capita -0.00289 -0.00831 -0.00680 0.0105∗∗ 0.00896∗∗ -0.00205 -0.0234 -0.205 -0.0839∗ -0.234
(0.00727) (0.00627) (0.00617) (0.00477) (0.00429) (0.00256) (0.0144) (0.136) (0.0451) (0.202)
Broad Money 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ -0.00894∗∗∗ -0.0100∗∗∗ -0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0431∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗
(0.00572) (0.00452) (0.00449) (0.00298) (0.00269) (0.00214) (0.0104) (0.107) (0.0328) (0.158)
Credit Dereg. 0.00390∗∗∗ 0.00246∗∗∗ 0.00311∗∗∗ -0.000688 -0.00133∗∗∗ -0.00179∗∗∗ 0.00448∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0987∗∗∗
(0.000862) (0.000697) (0.000693) (0.000520) (0.000441) (0.000347) (0.00166) (0.0168) (0.00524) (0.0249)
Obs. 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
adj. R2 0.173 0.104 0.130 0.024 0.055 0.196 0.033 0.008 -0.003 0.023
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country- and Year-Fixed Effects.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Finally, we performed the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for exogeneity of regressors
(“Durbin-Wu” statistics, together with p-values, are reported at the bottom of our main
results Table 422). Unsurprisingly, the null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected in all cases,
which confirms the need to use an instrumental variable. In all estimations, we will also
report the F-stat form of the Kleibergen-Paap statistic (“KFP” at the bottom of each
table), the heteroskedastic and clustering robust version of the Cragg-Donald statistic
suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) as a test for weak instruments. Most statistics are
comfortably above the critical values, confirming that our instrument is a strong predictor
of inequality.
22Statistics for other specifications/tables available upon request to the authors.
27
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.05
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Results
Table 4: Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Var. Household Credit/GDP
Inequality Measure Gini Top 10 Top 30 Mid. 30-90 Mid. 30-70 Bottom Top10
Mid.30−90
Top10
Bottom
Top30
Mid.30−70
Top30
Bottom
Inequality 3.645∗∗∗ 6.428∗∗∗ 5.654∗∗∗ -17.59∗ -12.79∗∗∗ -8.851∗∗∗ 2.923∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.942) (2.086) (1.677) (10.20) (4.791) (2.283) (0.967) (0.0510) (0.219) (0.0312)
GDP per capita 0.0183 0.0612 0.0462 0.192 0.122 -0.0104 0.0762 0.0510 0.0740 0.0390
(0.0353) (0.0518) (0.0451) (0.147) (0.0801) (0.0312) (0.0539) (0.0344) (0.0461) (0.0325)
Broad Money Ratio 0.0225 -0.00446 0.00616 -0.0212 0.00738 0.0214 0.00989 0.0789∗∗ 0.0543 0.0789∗∗
(0.0459) (0.0632) (0.0556) (0.118) (0.0702) (0.0454) (0.0616) (0.0381) (0.0452) (0.0373)
Credit Deregulation -0.0187∗∗∗ -0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0221∗∗∗ -0.0167 -0.0216∗∗ -0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0176∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0175∗∗∗ -0.0177∗∗∗
(0.00577) (0.00723) (0.00705) (0.0113) (0.00883) (0.00598) (0.00692) (0.00578) (0.00633) (0.00578)
Quantification
βIneq ∗ SDwithin 0.0729 0.1028 0.0848 -0.1935 -0.1151 -0.0619 0.1140 0.0859 0.0986 0.0774
DurbinWu− stat 27.871 26.793 27.603 27.919 26.649 31.681 26.998 24.932 26.620 24.733
P − value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
KPF − stat 24.089 11.440 15.775 2.867 8.083 26.802 10.08 20.579 15.705 24.209
Obs. 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
adj. R2 0.438 0.211 0.331 -1.117 0.040 0.440 0.068 0.362 0.217 0.417
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country- and Year-Fixed Effects. The critical value for the weak instruments test is based on a 10% 2SLS
bias at the 5% significance level, which is 16.4 in all estimations. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
We present in Table 4 our baseline results for equation 25, in which various indicators
of income distribution are instrumented by the number of ILO conventions ratified at the
country-level. In order to make meaningful comparisons, we report in the “Quantification”
row the product between the estimated parameter for each inequality indicator and its
within standard deviation.23 Column (1) relies on the Gini, which gives an idea of the
“average” inequality of the income distribution. Columns (2) to (6) go into more details
of the structure of inequality, first by focusing on top incomes (Top 10 in column (2)
and Top 30 in column (3)), then on middle incomes (either incomes from the 3rd to the
9th decile in column (4), or those from the 3rd to the 7th decile in column (5)) and low
incomes (up to the 3rd decile, in column (6)). Columns (7) to (10) go one step further by
studying the impact of relative variations of these different shares, through ratios between
top incomes and middle and lower incomes.
23As an alternative, we also report standardized coefficients (based on variables rescaled so as to have
0 mean and a variance equal to 1) in Table C.1 in Appendix C.
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The first theoretical prediction is validated: positive changes in inequality, as predicted
by changes in the number of ILO conventions ratified, are positively related to the ratio of
household credit to GDP. This result holds whatever the inequality indicator used, even
if the size of the effect varies significantly along the distribution of income (see below). In
all cases, the strength of our instruments is confirmed by the Kleibergen-Paap statistics.
Given the first stage coefficients (Table 3, column (1)), the ratification of one additional
ILO convention is found to generate a -0.0017 decrease in the Gini (on a [0-1] scale), which
in turn implies a 0.6 percentage point decrease in credit over GDP.
Regarding control variables, GDP per capita and M2 over GDP have the expected
positive signs, but are mostly insignificant. Conversely, financial deregulation exhibits
a negative impact on credit, which seems at first sight at odds with the intuition that
financial liberalization supports credit expansion. However, remember that we use the
ratio of credit over GDP as a dependent variable: in other words, the negative sign simply
means that there is a stronger correlation between financial liberalization and GDP than
between financial liberalization and credit. This is confirmed by the results displayed in
Tables 10 and 11, where the financial liberalization indicator shows the expected positive
impact on the log of household credit.
Regarding the size of the effects, a one standard deviation in the Gini index is associ-
ated with a 7.3 percentage point increase in the household credit to GDP ratio. Interest-
ingly, when we investigate specific parts of the income distribution, effects display some
quantitative heterogeneity: when inequality is measured through the top incomes share,
an increase by one standard deviation lifts the credit to GDP ratio by 10.3 (Top 10) and
8.5% (Top 30). Besides, as indicated by the second prediction of our model, this effect is
substantially higher where the share of middle-class incomes is concerned: when the share
of Middle30-90 (respectively, Middle30-70) in total income increases by one standard de-
viation (meaning a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of income), credit to GDP
decreases by 19.4 (respectively, -11.5) percentage points, whereas the same one standard
deviation increase in low-income share only cuts credit to GDP ratio by 6.2 percentage
points. A similar effect can be found with income shares ratios: credit over GDP rises
29
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.05
by 11.4% (respectively, 9.9%) following a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of
Top 10 (respectively Top 30) over Middle 30-90 (respectively Middle 30-70), and by 8.6%
(respectively 7.7%) following same increase for the ratio of Top 10 (respectively Top 30)
over Bottom.
All these results are consistent with the fact that the middle classes weigh significantly
more on aggregate credit, due to higher solvency and borrowing capacities. This would
suggest that expansion of household credit over the considered period is the consequence
of deteriorating standards of living, at least in relative terms.
5.2 Advanced versus Emerging Economies
The third and last implication of our theoretical approach predicts that the positive
causal link from inequality to household credit exists if and only if the country is suf-
ficiently developed. In a few words, the underlying intuitions are the following: on the
supply side, the financial system is on average less developed in emerging countries, mean-
ing more binding credit constraints and less credit available. On the demand side, it is
also plausible that the mechanism related to the relative income hypothesis and mimetic
consumption is less at play in economies where the middle class is not developed as it is
in the advanced countries; it is important since a key result of this paper is the quanti-
tative importance of the share of middle incomes to explain the aggregate dynamics of
credit. Since our sample includes a majority of developed countries, but also a significant
number of emerging countries, we can bring this intuition to the data by estimating again
our empirical model on two subsamples: the first one is restricted to developed countries
(estimates reported in Table 5), and the second one, to emerging economies (results in
Table 6).
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Table 5: Baseline with only advanced economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Var. Household Credit/GDP
Inequality Measure Gini Top 10 Top 30 Mid. 30-90 Mid. 30-70 Bottom Top10
Mid.30−90
Top10
Bottom
Top30
Mid.30−70
Top30
Bottom
Inequality 3.442∗∗∗ 5.139∗∗∗ 4.614∗∗∗ -9.947∗∗∗ -8.150∗∗∗ -8.304∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(1.260) (1.893) (1.700) (3.816) (2.861) (3.073) (0.366) (0.0800) (0.255) (0.0519)
GDP per capita -0.0416 -0.0668 -0.0418 -0.113 -0.0603 -0.0273 -0.0628 -0.0447 -0.0502 -0.0353
(0.0802) (0.0821) (0.0827) (0.0905) (0.0802) (0.0830) (0.0769) (0.0723) (0.0771) (0.0743)
Broad Money Ratio 0.124∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.106∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.0540) (0.0496) (0.0517) (0.0348) (0.0374) (0.0607) (0.0416) (0.0415) (0.0408) (0.0443)
Credit Deregulation -0.00800 -0.00238 -0.00633 0.0102 0.000923 -0.0128∗ -0.00119 -0.00367 -0.00256 -0.00581
(0.00585) (0.00568) (0.00592) (0.00755) (0.00587) (0.00655) (0.00543) (0.00520) (0.00551) (0.00543)
KPF − stat 18.90 16.693 18.800 11.130 20.593 18.839 18.576 44.738 30.133 43.625
Obs. 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611
Countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
adj. R2 0.599 0.581 0.600 0.500 0.621 0.574 0.595 0.665 0.650 0.656
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and Year Fixed Effects. The critical value for the weak instruments test is based on a 10% 2SLS
bias at the 5% significance level, which is 16.4 in all estimations. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Table 6: Baseline with only emerging economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Var. Household Credit/GDP
Inequality Measure Gini Top 10 Top 30 Mid. 30-90 Mid. 30-70 Bottom Top10
Mid.30−90
Top10
Bottom
Top30
Mid.30−70
Top30
Bottom
Inequality -0.793 -1.358 -1.340 2.101 2.058 3.656 -0.199 -0.0478 -0.143 -0.0324
(0.517) (0.923) (0.876) (1.537) (1.359) (2.497) (0.149) (0.0398) (0.104) (0.0265)
GDP per capita 0.201∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.0292) (0.0451) (0.0387) (0.0536) (0.0408) (0.0354) (0.0393) (0.0372) (0.0352) (0.0329)
Broad Money Ratio 0.0951∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.0933∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.0996∗∗∗ 0.0980∗∗∗ 0.0856∗∗∗ 0.0894∗∗∗ 0.0805∗∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0291) (0.0246) (0.0314) (0.0240) (0.0279) (0.0271) (0.0244) (0.0247) (0.0240)
Credit Deregulation -0.00284 -0.00206 0.000471 -0.00682 -0.00283 0.00594 -0.00553 -0.00228 -0.00458 -0.000604
(0.00624) (0.00705) (0.00814) (0.00510) (0.00651) (0.0116) (0.00584) (0.00866) (0.00616) (0.00967)
KPF − stat 10.977 5.623 5.48 5.415 7.208 3.187 4.172 2.963 4.956 2.923
Obs. 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285
Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
adj. R2 0.802 0.735 0.756 0.695 0.754 0.741 0.643 0.636 0.678 0.661
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and Year Fixed Effects. The critical value for the weak instruments test is based on a 10% 2SLS
bias at the 5% significance level, which is 16.4 in all estimations. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
As expected, our results, concerning both the impact of inequality and its structure,
hold strongly for developed economies, where middle-classes have access to credit and are
important enough to drive the dynamics of aggregated household credit. Conversely, no
such effect can be observed for emerging economies, possibly due to credit constraints (as
suggested by Kumhof et al., 2012) and too small middle classes (see Kochhar, 2015).It is
all the most striking that all inequality measures deliver the same message. Interestingly,
credit deregulation does not seem to have any impact on either subsample, and GDP per
capita emerges as a significant determinant only for developing economies. This would
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tend to suggest that, at an early stage of economic development, credit constraints ar so
binding that only an increase in average wealth per capita can ease access to credit; after
a certain threshold of development however, credit constraints become less binding (as
suggested by the insignifcant coefficient on GDP per capita), and the inequality mech-
anism driving up household credit (over GDP) suggested by our theoretical framework
starts working.
Finally, we investigate further the role of credit constraints in emerging economies, by
examining the heterogenous response of household credit to inequality according to the
openness to international financial flows. Here we use the Chinn and Ito index measuring
a country’s degree of capital account openness. Table 7 shows how the causal relationship
between household credit over GDP (columns (1) to (3)) and the log of real household
credit (columns (4) to (6)) is altered around a threshold of 0.65 for the index, above which
countries have a capital account considered as fully open. Interestingly, the result show
that emerging countries displaying a sufficient level of openness to international capital
flows (columns (2) and (5)) do exhibit a positive impact of inequality on household credit.
Conversely, there is not any impact of the Gini index on credit for countries with a low or
limited level of openness (i.e. below this threshold, see columns (3) and (6)). This goes
again in the direction of a relaxation of credit constraints by incoming financial flows,
allowing wider categories of the population to access credit, and consequently, to react to
variations in inequality.
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Table 7: Level of financial openness of emerging economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Household Credit/GDP log(Real Household Credit)
Kaopen >0.65 <0.65 >0.65 <0.65
Gini -0.800 1.054∗ 0.902 -37.63∗∗∗ 6.862∗∗ -99.42∗
(0.504) (0.629) (6.908) (12.58) (3.073) (54.85)
GDP per capita 0.198∗∗∗ -0.0222 -0.00461 4.821∗∗∗ 0.0164 6.340∗
(0.0344) (0.133) (0.499) (0.974) (0.771) (3.340)
Broad Money Ratio 0.0885∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗ 0.164
(0.0282) (0.0450) (0.377)
Log(Real Broad Money) 1.069∗∗ -0.614∗∗∗ 5.965∗∗
(0.520) (0.213) (2.571)
KPF − stat 10.821 5.329 0.136 14.298 5.820 3.323
Obs. 285 68 214 285 68 214
Countries 16 6 10 16 6 10
adj. R2 0.801 -0.017 0.850 0.108 0.666 -1.144
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and Year Fixed Effects. The critical value for the weak
instruments test is based on a 10% 2SLS bias at the 5% significance level, which is 16.4 in all estimations.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
5.3 Robustness and Falsification Tests
Definition of the Middle Classes. A key result reported above is the quantitative
prevalence of the middle classes in the positive causal impact of inequalities on household
credit over/GDP. However, it could be argued that this is due mainly to the two specific
definitions of the middle classes we use, i.e. the share of income held by incomes after the
3rd and up to the 9th decile, or the share held by incomes after the 3rd and up to the 7th.
Therefore, Table 8 reports the results of estimates testing the validity of this definition,
based on two strategies. First, columns (1) and (4) substitute for our preferred definitions
of the middle classes on the right-hand side two alternatives : the share of income owned
by the 3rd to the 8th decile (the definition proposed by Easterly, 2001) in column (1), and
the share of income owned by the 4th to the 7th decile in column (4). While slightly lower,
corresponding quantifications are still around twice higher than the one found for low
incomes in Table 4. Second, columns (3) and (6) report estimates that, on the contrary,
have to be understood more as falsification tests, to the extent the variables they are
based on mix explicitly low (2nd and 3rd decile) and middle incomes. As expected, the
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estimated coefficients (still negative and significant) are getting closer to the one reported
in column (6) in Table 4. Finally, columns (2) and (5) display estimates which are com-
promises between these two strategies, by putting the lower bound on the 2nd decile. Also
as expected, elasticities remain negative and significant, somewhat higher than the one
found on low incomes, but still lower than when the estimation is restricted to consistent
definitions of the midd classes. All in all, Table 8 does confirm the importance of the
middle classes in the positive dynamics linking inequality to credit.
Table 8: Baseline with various definitions of the middle classes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Household Credit/GDP
Middle Classes 30-80 20-80 10-80 40-70 20-70 10-70
Middle -13.30∗∗ -9.016∗∗∗ -6.563∗∗∗ -19.21∗∗ -8.779∗∗∗ -6.437∗∗∗
(5.803) (3.324) (2.104) (7.780) (2.938) (1.939)
GDP per capita 0.150 0.109 0.0683 0.117 0.0914 0.0560
(0.101) (0.0739) (0.0546) (0.0843) (0.0633) (0.0490)
Broad Money Ratio -0.0128 0.000793 0.0161 0.0157 0.0143 0.0257
(0.0883) (0.0706) (0.0574) (0.0718) (0.0608) (0.0519)
Credit Deregulation -0.0210∗∗ -0.0215∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗ -0.0172∗∗ -0.0219∗∗∗ -0.0214∗∗∗
(0.0100) (0.00859) (0.00744) (0.00858) (0.00793) (0.00709)
Quantification
βMid ∗ SDwithin -0.1444 -0.1169 -0.0978 -0.1332 -0.1015 -0.0879
KPF − stat 5.508 8.369 12.174 6.594 10.996 14.895
Obs. 896 896 896 896 896 896
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41
adj. R2 -0.281 0.055 0.246 -0.139 0.210 0.327
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and Year Fixed Effects. The critical value for the weak
instruments test is based on a 10% 2SLS bias at the 5% significance level, which is 16.4 in all estimations.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Impact of the Great Recession. One may argue that our results may be influenced by
the Great Recession, which has been notably characterized by an abrupt credit crunch.
Table 9 replicates estimates from Table 4 but excluding all years after 2007. Reported
results are basically identical to those presented in Table 4, indicating that no impact of
the Great Recession on our key mechanism can be detected.
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Table 9: Baseline without the Great Recession (years after 2007 excluded)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Var. Household Credit/GDP
Inequality Measure Gini Top 10 Top 30 Mid. 30-90 Mid. 30-70 Bottom Top10
Mid.30−90
Top10
Bottom
Top30
Mid.30−70
Top30
Bottom
Inequality 3.685∗∗∗ 6.847∗∗∗ 5.651∗∗∗ -28.18 -15.06∗∗ -8.341∗∗∗ 3.428∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(1.007) (2.376) (1.715) (25.12) (6.135) (2.233) (1.274) (0.0627) (0.281) (0.0371)
GDP per capita 0.147∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.817 0.427∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.0443) (0.0764) (0.0599) (0.643) (0.153) (0.0390) (0.0848) (0.0415) (0.0639) (0.0409)
Broad Money Ratio 0.0304 0.0194 0.0215 0.0361 0.0338 0.0300 0.0279 0.118∗∗∗ 0.0696 0.115∗∗∗
(0.0528) (0.0685) (0.0592) (0.165) (0.0760) (0.0523) (0.0740) (0.0433) (0.0541) (0.0419)
Credit Deregulation -0.0257∗∗∗ -0.0319∗∗∗ -0.0322∗∗∗ -0.0523 -0.0434∗∗∗ -0.0245∗∗∗ -0.0312∗∗∗ -0.0249∗∗∗ -0.0318∗∗∗ -0.0252∗∗∗
(0.00723) (0.0105) (0.00947) (0.0423) (0.0167) (0.00697) (0.0108) (0.00675) (0.00916) (0.00668)
KPF − stat 21.362 9.840 15.354 1.169 6.626 25.204 7.776 20.882 13.857 25.190
Obs. 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
Countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
adj. R2 0.319 -0.037 0.220 -5.490 -0.357 0.337 -0.445 0.170 -0.118 0.290
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and Year Fixed Effects. The critical value for the weak instruments test is based on a 10% 2SLS
bias at the 5% significance level, which is 16.4 in all estimations. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Dependent Variable. We provided several arguments in the data section supporting
the ratio of household credit over GDP as a dependent variable. To sum it up, our focus
is on the part of the rise in credit which is not matched by a corresponding increase in
output. Still, we check how estimates change when we use instead the log of household
credit to its ratio over GDP as a dependent variable in equation 25. The results of this
modification are reported in Tables 10 and 11, which replicates the structure of Table 4,
respectively for developed and emerging countries. Regarding developed countries, it is
striking to see that our first prediction still holds: estimates keep supporting a positive
impact of inequality on the log of household credit, whatever the variable used to proxy
inequality. However, there does not seem to be any difference between middle-class and
bottom incomes anymore.
Concerning emerging economies, the picture is less clear: our key result on the positive
relationship between inequality and credit seems to be reverted in most specifications: an
exogenous increase in inequality seems to raise the log of household credit. However, the
negative R2 is clearly an invitation not to overinterpret these results: they indicate that
with the log of household credit as a dependent variable, on average over the sample of
emerging countries, our empirical model fits the data quite badly. Besides, column (5)
in Table 7 presented previously suggested that above a sufficient threshold of openness
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to international capital flows, the positive impact of inequality on the log of household
credit was restored also for emerging economies, in an estimated specification with correct
statistical properties (high and positive R2, sufficient predictive power of the instrumental
variable).
Table 10: Log with only advanced economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Var. log(Real Household Credit)
Inequality Measure Gini Top 10 Top 30 Mid. 30-90 Mid. 30-70 Bottom Top10
Mid.30−90
Top10
Bottom
Top30
Mid.30−70
Top30
Bottom
Inequality 9.652∗∗ 13.93∗∗ 12.90∗∗ -25.13∗∗ -21.96∗∗∗ -24.05∗∗ 6.794∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 2.139∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗
(4.019) (5.710) (5.393) (9.783) (8.363) (10.36) (2.666) (0.259) (0.791) (0.173)
GDP per capita 2.519∗∗∗ 2.397∗∗∗ 2.504∗∗∗ 2.129∗∗∗ 2.345∗∗∗ 2.621∗∗∗ 2.349∗∗∗ 2.455∗∗∗ 2.419∗∗∗ 2.513∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.321) (0.341) (0.301) (0.311) (0.363) (0.311) (0.308) (0.315) (0.320)
log(Real Broad Money) -0.0641 -0.00994 -0.0486 0.147∗∗ 0.0614 -0.124 0.0167 -0.00764 0.0138 -0.0378
(0.117) (0.102) (0.111) (0.0710) (0.0745) (0.140) (0.0925) (0.0890) (0.0843) (0.0975)
Credit Deregulation 0.0526∗∗ 0.0690∗∗∗ 0.0574∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.0779∗∗∗ 0.0377 0.0742∗∗∗ 0.0644∗∗∗ 0.0680∗∗∗ 0.0578∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0217) (0.0245) (0.0211) (0.0236) (0.0212) (0.0200) (0.0205) (0.0204)
Quantification
βIneq ∗ SDwithin 0.1783 0.1972 0.1774 -0.2384 -0.1724 -0.1780 0.1902 0.1281 0.1465 0.1291
KPF − stat 18.011 17.342 18.120 13.630 22.134 16.491 19.678 40.864 30.056 37.872
Obs. 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611
Countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
adj. R2 0.730 0.721 0.730 0.707 0.759 0.709 0.735 0.782 0.772 0.774
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and Year Fixed Effects. The critical value for the weak instruments test is based on a 10% 2SLS
bias at the 5% significance level, which is 16.4 in all estimations. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Table 11: Log with only emerging economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Var. log(Real Household Credit)
Inequality Measure Gini Top 10 Top 30 Mid. 30-90 Mid. 30-70 Bottom Top10
Mid.30−90
Top10
Bottom
Top30
Mid.30−70
Top30
Bottom
Gini -46.83∗∗∗ -70.47∗∗ -78.04∗∗ 100.1∗∗∗ 116.0∗∗ 223.3∗ -29.39∗∗ -3.244 -8.619∗∗ -2.312
(16.88) (28.30) (35.45) (36.87) (46.13) (132.4) (13.40) (2.260) (4.322) (1.694)
GDP per capita 5.146∗∗∗ 5.566∗∗∗ 5.908∗∗∗ 5.232∗∗∗ 5.687∗∗∗ 5.968∗∗ 5.610∗∗∗ 6.333∗∗ 5.513∗∗∗ 6.303∗∗
(1.126) (1.444) (1.724) (1.242) (1.415) (2.339) (1.667) (2.901) (1.698) (3.017)
log (Real Broad Money) 0.170 0.947 0.327 1.493∗∗ 0.660 -0.215 0.973 -0.811 0.139 -1.163
(0.620) (0.721) (0.803) (0.685) (0.714) (1.055) (0.793) (1.444) (0.853) (1.673)
Credit Deregulation 0.612∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗ 0.781∗∗ 0.282∗ 0.540∗∗ 1.207∗ 0.454∗ 0.751 0.499∗ 0.903
(0.232) (0.248) (0.366) (0.149) (0.241) (0.702) (0.240) (0.556) (0.289) (0.684)
Quantification
βIneq ∗ SDwithin -1.0518 -1.3713 -1.4443 1.4091 1.3673 1.8159 -1.6652 -2.1919 -1.7029 -2.2084
KPF − stat 11.880 7.699 6.29 8.323 8.842 3.218 5.603 2.299 4.997 2.079
Obs. 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285
Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
adj. R2 -0.108 -0.681 -0.947 -0.630 -0.660 -1.800 -1.701 -3.761 -2.120 -3.796
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and Year Fixed Effects. The critical value for the weak instruments test is based on a 10% 2SLS
bias at the 5% significance level, which is 16.4 in all estimations. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Falsification tests. Most theoretical frameworks, including ours, predict that only
household credit should be driven by inequality. A simple falsification test is therefore
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to check the impact on other credit aggregates, for which there should be no impact.
A straightforward example is credit granted to private firms. On the other hand, what
should be the impact of inequality on total credit is less clear, since it is the sum of both
household and business credit.
Therefore, Table 12 reports estimates of equation 25 where the inequality indicator is
the Gini (predicted by our IV), and the dependent variable is alternatively total credit
from the World Bank (column (1)), total credit from the BIS (column (2)), total bank
credit form the BIS (column (3)), firm credit (column (4)) and household credit (column
(5)) - all regressions reported in Table 12 were rerun on a common sample to make sure
that the sample alteration cannot be responsible for some differences. Columns (6) to
(10) replicate columns (1) to (5) for a period excluding years after 2007, once again to
premune against any influence from the Great Recession. As expected, inequality does
not have any impact on firm credit (columns (4) and (9)), or on bank credit (columns (3)
and (8)). Besides, columns (1)/(2) and (6)/(7) show that the way total credit is measured
may be non-neutral on the result. When the measure by the World Bank is used, the
impact of inequality remains positive (as in Perugini et al., 2016). When the measure by
the BIS (the most legitimate for us since household and firm credit also come from the
BIS) is used instead, the impact of the predicted Gini coefficient becomes insignificant
over the whole period of estimation. A possible explanation comes from the fact that the
World Bank aggregate excludes credit from the international financial sector, which may
create a bias in the results. In any case, this “falsification evidence” indicates that the
positive causal impact of inequality is mainly concentrated on household credit.
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Table 12: Falsification Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Whole Sample Before 2008
Dep. Var: Credit/GDP TotalWB TotalBIS Bank Firm Household TotalWB TotalBIS Bank Firm Household
Gini 15.44∗∗∗ 1.260 -2.089 -2.362 5.650∗∗∗ 17.67∗∗∗ 5.250∗∗ 2.184 0.809 6.727∗∗∗
(5.004) (2.301) (2.029) (1.824) (1.966) (6.097) (2.616) (1.635) (1.368) (2.379)
GDP per capita -0.111 -0.0205 0.0952∗∗ -0.0745 0.0423 0.170 0.311∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.0932∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.0604) (0.0449) (0.0466) (0.0496) (0.164) (0.0927) (0.0657) (0.0533) (0.0718)
Broad Money Ratio -0.136 0.254∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ -0.0360 -0.263 0.130 0.250∗∗∗ 0.0944 -0.0725
(0.199) (0.0980) (0.0874) (0.0742) (0.0787) (0.254) (0.122) (0.0873) (0.0655) (0.0992)
Credit Deregulation -0.0458∗∗ 0.00543 0.0317∗∗ 0.0250∗∗ -0.0271∗∗∗ -0.0900∗∗∗ -0.00732 0.00374 0.0226∗∗ -0.0416∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0110) (0.00911) (0.0326) (0.0160) (0.0118) (0.00980) (0.0132)
KPF − stat 9.913 9.913 9.913 9.913 9.913 8.723 8.723 8.723 8.723 8.723
Obs. 867 867 867 867 867 653 653 653 653 653
Countries 39 39 39 39 39 37 37 37 37 37
adj. R2 -0.393 0.573 0.274 0.246 0.134 -0.732 0.447 0.324 0.376 -0.294
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and Year Fixed Effects. The critical value for the weak instruments test is based on a 10% 2SLS bias
at the 5% significance level, which is 16.4 in all estimations. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
6 Conclusion
This paper extends the DSGE framework by Kumhof et al. (2015) to provide the intu-
ition that both inequality and its structure should matter on credit dynamics. Based on a
41-country dataset over the period 1970-2014, we confirm the first theoretical prediction
of the model: using various indicators of inequality, we show that household credit is
positively impacted by inequality when the latter is predicted by exogenous shocks on
the number of ILO conventions ratified. A second prediction of our theoretical setting is
that this positive impact should be stronger when inequality hits more middle classes (i.e.
when their share of total income decreases, either in absolute or relative terms). This is
once again confirmed by our empirical exercise. Those results are supported by various
robustness and falsification tests, as well as alternative samples, which also show that
our results hold mostly for developed countries, consistently with the third implication
of the theoretical approach. For emerging economies, no such effects can be observed
on average, possibly due to credit constraints and insufficiently important middle income
categories. Consistently, it appears that the positive impact of inequality on household
credit is restored on a sample of emerging countries with sufficient openness of the capital
account: by relaxing financial constraints, capital inflows allow middle and low income
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individuals to access credit more easily.
Our work has important implications regarding financial crises prevention. In order to
avoid financial crises such as the one of 2007-2009, which triggered the Great Recession,
one has therefore to prevent the creation of household leverage bubbles. Our findings
suggest that the reduction of inequality is an important prerequisite of such a policy,
especially at the middle of the income distribution.
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A Appendix A: Additional Proofs and Discussions
A.1 Proof of the equation (20)
We combine equation (16) and (17) and we reinject the level of consumption from
equations (13) and (14). We log-linearize the sum to simplify the results. Then we
generate the following function f(log(bM), log(zM)) = 0. By assuming that price variables
(pM , pL) and low-income households’ variables (bL, zL) are fixed, the total derivative of f
is given by
df = 0 = ∂f
∂log(bM)dlog(b
M) + ∂f
∂log(zM)dlog(z
M) (26)
This yields
dlog(bM)
dlog(zM)
= −∂f/∂log(z
M)
∂f/∂log(bM)
(27)
We derive and find the equation (20). The same process holds for low-income households
with equations (18) and (19).
A.2 Redistribution between middle-income and low-income house-
holds
We derive the effect of an increase in low- and middle classes’ income share zi on the
steady-state debt level bj for i ∈ (L,M) and i 6= j,
dlog(bi)
dlog(zj)
=
θ−1
θ
+ 1
σ
1
χi
y
cj
1
θ
+ 1
σ
1
χi
1−pi
ci
+ 1
η
χi
χT
1
1+ χi
χT
bi
− 1
σ
χi
χT
1−pi
cT
(28)
Following our assumption on the demand-side argument, this cross derivative exercise
provides a positive impact of this redistribution in favor of the group j on the level of the
debt chosen by the group j.
A.3 Proof of the 2nd Testable Prediction
The proof is obtained by using the demand-side argument developed in equation (20)
and by distinguishing the numerator and denominator of each part of the inequation (22).
About the numerator, we refer to our demand-side mechanism, that holds with θ < 1.
To obtain the inequation (22) with the assumption that denominators are positive, the
numerators should respect the following condition
θ − 1
θ
+ 1
σ
1
χM
y
cM
<
θ − 1
θ
+ 1
σ
1
χL
y
cL
< 0 (29)
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This condition is reasonably satisfied if we suppose that the second term relative to the
consumption-output share is not higher than the first term. At the steady-state, the con-
sumption per capita for middle-class earners should be higher than that of the poorest
households. By definition of the three groups of households as defined in Table A.1, we
have χLcL < χMcM , which supports the inequation (29).
In addition, Bertrand and Morse (2016) highlight that U.S. income inequality is posi-
tively correlated with the consumption share of the non-rich classes, but the quantitative
result is stronger for the middle classes. It means that the demand-side mechanism is lower
for low-income households than middle-class ones. Put differently, the curvature param-
eter θ of the utility function could be different between borrowers, but this assumption is
not required for the inequation (29).
Table A.1: Quantitative Results - Baseline Case
Symbol Parameter Value Source
y Steady-State Output Level 1
χT Population Share of Top Income Households 0.10 Literature.
χM Population Share of Middle Class Households 0.50 Literature.
χL Population Share of Low-Income Class Households 0.40 Literature.
zT Steady-State Top 10% Output Share 0.30 WIID
zM Steady-State Middle Class Output Share 0.55 WIID
zL Steady-State Low-Income Class Output Share 0.15 WIID
The steady-state output is normalized to one. The decomposition of bottom earners
into low and middle-class incomes follows Palma (2011) and our empirical strategy. We
use our inequality data from WIID in a similar fashion to determine steady-state output
shares for the three classes.
Given the inequation (29), the result obtained in inequation (22) also depends on their
denominators and yields the following condition
0 < 1
σ
[
1
χM
1− pM
cM
− χ
M
χT
1− pM
cT
]
+ 1
η
χM
χT
1
1 + χM
χT
bM
<
1
σ
[
1
χL
1− pL
cL
− χ
L
χT
1− pL
cT
]
+ 1
η
χL
χT
1
1 + χL
χT
bL
(30)
The first term on both sides of the inequation (30) reflects the trade-off between price
and quantity for both loans to middle-class and low-income households. Based on the
financial exclusion frontier in ( French et al., 2013) and segregation (Ouazad and Ran-
cière, 2016), we could easily assume that the market power of low-income household is
lower than those of middle-class. Again, the smaller the amount pt, the more expensive
the implicit interest rate. So we anticipate that pM ≥ pL. If the top income households’
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consumption is quite high, the first term on both sides fits the inequation (30).
The last term in both sides of the inequation (30) also depends on the steady-state
debt levels bM and bL. We reasonably expect that the steady-state debt level to mid-
dle class bM is sufficiently higher than those to low-income class bL, which supports the
testable prediction. An additional, though not crucial, argument can be found on Carroll
(2002) and Goetzmann and Kumar (2008): the curvature parameter η of the utility func-
tion with respect to wealth could be potentially different between borrowers. We could
imagine that top income households could prefer lending to middle-class ones, which again
holds for inequation (30).
It is clear from this inequation (30) that middle-class are the key driver of this positive
impact of inequality on household credit if (i) the middle classes consumption is sufficiently
higher than the low-income household one, (ii) there is some discrimination against the
poorer ones and (iii) the pass-through to implicit interest rate of an inequality shock is
not too high.
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B Appendix B: Data Appendix
Household credit is our key dependent variable, but there is no unique data source
according to our time and geographical coverages. Data reported by different sources
may exhibit discrepancy under mutually consistent definitions. We build a general data
map to ensure comparability and to achieve a reliable identification of the link between
household credit and inequality.
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Table B.2: List of Advanced Economies: Time Coverage and Main Sources
Baseline Coverage WIID Source Household Cred. Firm Cred. Total BIS
Australia 1981-2010 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Austria 1995-2014 Eurostat, European Comm. BIS BIS BIS
Belgium 1995-2014 Eurostat, European Comm. BIS BIS BIS
Canada 1981-2010 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Czech Republic 1995-2013 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Denmark 1994-2010 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Estonia 2004-2014 Eurostat CB CB
Finland 1970-2014 Eurostat, National Source BIS BIS BIS
France 1980-2010 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Germany 1978-2013 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Greece 1995-2014 Eurostat BIS BIS BIS
Hungary* 1991-2012 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Iceland 2004-2014 Eurostat CB CB
Ireland 2002-2014 Eurostat, European Comm. BIS BIS BIS
Italy 1986-2010 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Malta 2005-2014 Eurostat CB CB
Netherlands 1990-2013 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Norway 1979-2013 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Poland 1995-2013 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Portugal 1995-2014 Eurostat, European Comm. BIS BIS BIS
Spain 1980-2013 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Sweden 1981-2014 LIS, Eurostat BIS BIS BIS
Switzerland 2007-2014 Eurostat BIS BIS BIS
United Kingdom 1970-2014 IFS, Eurostat BIS BIS BIS
United States 1979-2013 LIS BIS BIS BIS
(*) defined as emerging country for World Bank classification. We follow UN classification.
Table B.3: List of Emerging Economies: Time Coverage and Main Sources
Baseline Coverage WIID Source Household Cred. Firm Cred. Total BIS
Argentina 1994-2014 SEDLAC 2016 CB BIS BIS
Brazil 1994-2014 SEDLAC 2016 BIS BIS BIS
Chile* 1987-2013 SEDLAC 2016 CB CB
China 1992-2013 World Bank OXFORD BIS BIS
Colombia 1996-2013 EDLAC BIS BIS BIS
India 2004-2011 World Bank OXFORD BIS BIS
Indonesia 2001-2014 World Bank BIS BIS BIS
Israel* 1992-2012 LIS BIS BIS BIS
Korea* 1970-2012 OECD, Other BIS BIS BIS
Malaysia 2006-2009 World Bank OXFORD BIS BIS
Mexico 1994-2014 SEDLAC 2016 BIS BIS BIS
Russian Fed.* 1998-2012 World Bank BIS BIS BIS
Singapore* 2003-2012 National Source BIS BIS BIS
South Africa 1994-2011 World Bank OXFORD BIS/OXFORD BIS
Thailand 1991-2013 World Bank BIS BIS BIS
Turkey 1987-2013 World Bank BIS BIS BIS
(*) defined as emerging country for World Bank classification. We follow UN classification.
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Table B.4: Sources of Inequality Measures after processing WIID
Source Countries
LIS 15
Eurostat 11
European Commission 2
OECD 1
World Bank 8
SEDLAC, EDLAC 5
National Sources, Other 4
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C Appendix C: Instrumental Variable, First Stage
and Additional Tests
Table C.1: Baseline, Standardized Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Var. Household Credit/GDP
Inequality Measure Gini Top 10 Top 30 Mid. 30-90 Mid. 30-70 Bottom Top10
Mid.30−90
Top10
Bottom
Top30
Mid.30−70
Top30
Bottom
Inequality 1.288∗∗∗ 1.779∗∗∗ 1.621∗∗∗ -2.882∗ -2.141∗∗∗ -1.109∗∗∗ 1.967∗∗∗ 1.525∗∗∗ 1.793∗∗∗ 1.408∗∗∗
(0.333) (0.577) (0.481) (1.672) (0.802) (0.286) (0.650) (0.369) (0.498) (0.330)
GDP per capita 0.0653 0.218 0.165 0.684 0.436 -0.0370 0.272 0.182 0.264 0.139
(0.126) (0.185) (0.161) (0.526) (0.285) (0.111) (0.192) (0.123) (0.164) (0.116)
Broad Money Ratio 0.0340 -0.00673 0.00930 -0.0321 0.0111 0.0324 0.0149 0.119∗∗ 0.0820 0.119∗∗
(0.0693) (0.0954) (0.0839) (0.179) (0.106) (0.0686) (0.0930) (0.0574) (0.0682) (0.0563)
Credit Deregulation -0.164∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.146 -0.189∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗
(0.0506) (0.0634) (0.0618) (0.0992) (0.0774) (0.0524) (0.0606) (0.0506) (0.0554) (0.0506)
DurbinWu− stat 27.871 26.793 27.603 27.919 26.649 31.681 26.998 24.932 26.620 24.733
P − value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
KPF − stat 24.089 11.440 15.775 2.867 8.083 26.802 10.08 20.579 15.705 24.209
Obs. 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
adj. R2 0.438 0.211 0.331 -1.117 0.040 0.440 0.068 0.362 0.217 0.417
All variables are standardized, except the log(real GDP per capita). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and Year Fixed Effects.
The critical value for the weak instruments test is based on a 10% 2SLS bias at the 5% significance level, which is 16.4 in all estimations.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Table C.2: First Stage Inequality Structure, Lagged Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Var. Gini Top 10 Top30 Middle 30 90 Middle 30 70 Bottom Top10
Mid.30−90
Top10
Bottom
Top30
Mid.30−70
Top30
Bottom
# ILO Convt−1 -0.000939∗∗∗ -0.000529∗∗∗ -0.000588∗∗∗ 0.000194 0.000253∗∗ 0.000387∗∗∗ -0.00116∗∗∗ -0.0178∗∗∗ -0.00434∗∗∗ -0.0282∗∗∗
(0.0620) (0.0664) (0.0616) (0.0831) (0.0669) (0.0669) (0.0645) (0.0588) (0.0574) (0.0585)
GDP per capita -0.00569 -0.0105∗ -0.00920 0.0115∗∗ 0.0102∗∗ -0.000772 -0.0263∗ -0.186 -0.0886∗ -0.213
(0.00751) (0.00639) (0.00632) (0.00486) (0.00432) (0.00274) (0.0146) (0.137) (0.0455) (0.205)
Broad Money R. 0.0301∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ -0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0455∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
(0.00578) (0.00458) (0.00455) (0.00304) (0.00275) (0.00215) (0.0107) (0.117) (0.0345) (0.171)
Credit Dereg. 0.00441∗∗∗ 0.00305∗∗∗ 0.00363∗∗∗ -0.00123∗∗ -0.00182∗∗∗ -0.00193∗∗∗ 0.00569∗∗∗ 0.0594∗∗∗ 0.0196∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.000834) (0.000679) (0.000667) (0.000499) (0.000419) (0.000338) (0.00162) (0.0163) (0.00505) (0.0241)
Obs. 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
adj. R2 0.186 0.117 0.142 0.033 0.067 0.203 0.041 0.014 0.002 0.029
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and Year Fixed Effects. The critical value for the weak instruments test is based on a 10% 2SLS bias
at the 5% significance level, which is 16.4 in all estimations. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Table C.3: Testing for Exclusion Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Advanced economies Emerging economies
Inequality measure Gini Top10
Mid30−90
Top10
Bottom
Top30
Mid30−70
Top30
Bottom
Gini Top10
Mid30−90
Top10
Bottom
Top30
Mid30−70
Top30
Bottom
Inequality -0.587 -0.0905 -0.0493 -0.0830 -0.0458 -0.0224 0.0233 0.00245 0.00681 0.00131
(0.495) (0.401) (0.0512) (0.151) (0.0335) (0.200) (0.0458) (0.00461) (0.0148) (0.00365)
# ILO Conv. -0.00428∗ -0.00379 -0.00435 -0.00405 -0.00466∗ 0.00109 0.00117 0.00118 0.00117 0.00117
(0.00244) (0.00256) (0.00255) (0.00259) (0.00248) (0.00151) (0.00144) (0.00141) (0.00144) (0.00142)
GDP per capita 0.0524 0.0428 0.0545 0.0483 0.0590 0.160∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.166) (0.162) (0.165) (0.161) (0.0296) (0.0278) (0.0292) (0.0283) (0.0293)
Broad Money Ratio 0.225∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.0853 0.0840 0.0850 0.0848 0.0852
(0.0989) (0.0962) (0.0970) (0.0972) (0.0972) (0.0572) (0.0578) (0.0593) (0.0585) (0.0595)
Credit Dereg. -0.000451 -0.00159 -0.00115 -0.00144 -0.000381 -0.0102∗∗∗ -0.0107∗∗∗ -0.0108∗∗∗ -0.0107∗∗∗ -0.0108∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.00978) (0.0101) (0.00998) (0.0102) (0.00346) (0.00347) (0.00347) (0.00344) (0.00348)
Cons. -0.00954 -0.0356 -0.101 -0.00659 -0.0704 -1.727∗∗∗ -1.701∗∗∗ -1.701∗∗∗ -1.708∗∗∗ -1.709∗∗∗
(1.639) (1.632) (1.636) (1.620) (1.645) (0.309) (0.314) (0.330) (0.318) (0.328)
Obs. 611 611 611 611 611 285 285 285 285 285
Countries 25 25 25 25 25 16 16 16 16 16
adj. R2 0.752 0.749 0.751 0.750 0.753 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country and Year Fixed Effects. The critical value for the weak instruments test is based on a 10% 2SLS bias
at the 5% significance level, which is 16.4 in all estimations. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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